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Only two of ten big single-asset deals from 2016 to 2019 earned an A-range grade
Big single-asset deals mostly disappoint, and paying more or buying later didn’t help: of ten $1 billion-plus single-asset biopharma acquisitions from 2016 to 2019, six scored C or lower in Sleuth’s September 2024 review, and neither the largest deals nor the latest-stage assets earned an A-range grade. Only AstraZeneca’s purchase of Acerta Pharma for Calquence (A) and Merck’s purchase of Peloton Therapeutics for Welireg (A-) reached the A range, grading each key asset against the deal’s original rationale. Pfizer’s Eucrisa (D-) and AbbVie’s Rova-T (F) scored lowest.
Business development is hard even when the science works. An asset can clear clinical risk and still lose to a better-positioned competitor, stall on reimbursement or stumble at launch.
Deal size and a later stage did not buy a better grade
The two A-range grades went to two of the smaller deals: $4.0 billion for Acerta in February 2016, with Calquence in Phase 2/3, and about $2.3 billion for Peloton in May 2019, with Welireg in Phase 2. Calquence reached $2.5 billion in FY23 sales, and Welireg grew 77% in 2023 and expanded its label through the LITESPARK-005 trial. The three largest deals graded lower: Amgen’s $13.4 billion purchase of Otezla from Celgene (B-), AbbVie’s $9.8 billion Stemcentrx deal for Rova-T (F) and Novartis’s $8.7 billion AveXis deal for Zolgensma (B).
Buying later did not remove the risk either. None of the four assets bought at registration or already on the market scored above B-: Otezla (B-), Sanofi’s Cablivi (C), Novartis’s Xiidra (D) and Eucrisa (D-). Novartis paid Takeda $5.3 billion for Xiidra in 2019 and sold it to Bausch + Lomb in July 2023 for $1.75 billion upfront plus $750 million in sales milestones.
Clinical de-risking moves the risk to launch and competition rather than removing it.
Competitors and slow launches explain most of the misses
Merck paid $2.7 billion for ArQule in December 2019 to get ARQ 531 (nemtabrutinib), a Phase 1 BTK inhibitor, then recorded more than $2 billion in impairment charges as its timeline stretched and Lilly’s BTK inhibitor from Loxo reached approval first. Eucrisa, bought with Anacor for $5.2 billion, was overtaken by Dupixent as Pfizer struggled to break into dermatology and win reimbursement; it sold just $138 million in 2019 against a $2.0 billion peak sales estimate.
Leqvio, which Novartis bought with The Medicines Company in 2019, had a slow launch, with its US “buy and bill” model meeting resistance among cardiologists, and posted $355 million in FY23 sales against a peak estimate above $2 billion. Sleuth’s review of biotech sales forecast accuracy found misses like these are common.
Launches are hard to recover from: a floundering asset rarely revives, because companies shift resources elsewhere and first impressions stick with physicians and key opinion leaders.
Fit, competitive intelligence and patient focus separate the winners
In Sleuth’s view, three strategies tend to work. The first is operating in a “zone of competency,” where the acquirer already knows the prescribers and may have reimbursement leverage from other products, as AbbVie had in immunology when it followed Humira with Skyrizi and Rinvoq.
The second is competitive intelligence: knowing every competing asset, the design decisions behind it and how it differs from the target. The third is finding untapped patient segments, even in crowded markets, because a label that stands out for a specific group sets a higher floor for demand, a choice Sleuth explores in how indication selection dictates commercial strategy.
Price and stage set what an acquirer pays, but fit and differentiation decided the grades.
Grades, deal terms and sales are as of September 17, 2024, with sales for FY23 unless another year is noted. The set is non-exhaustive and covers single-asset-driven deals worth more than $1 billion. This page is a dated snapshot.
Frequently asked questions about single-asset M&A deals
Which single-asset biopharma acquisitions from 2016 to 2019 worked best?
In Sleuth’s September 2024 grading of ten deals worth more than $1 billion, AstraZeneca’s $4.0 billion Acerta deal for Calquence earned an A and Merck’s roughly $2.3 billion Peloton deal for Welireg an A-. Calquence reached $2.5 billion in FY23 sales.
Did paying more or buying later lead to better outcomes?
Not in this set. In the September 2024 grades, the three largest deals, Otezla ($13.4 billion), Rova-T ($9.8 billion) and Zolgensma ($8.7 billion), scored B-, F and B, and none of the four assets bought at registration or already marketed scored above B-.
What makes a single-asset acquisition succeed?
Sleuth’s September 2024 review points to buying within the acquirer’s existing commercial strengths, rigorous competitive intelligence on rival assets and a differentiated label for an untapped patient segment, backed by a strong launch.
